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Abstract
An on-going debate in the energy economics and power market community has raised the question if energy-
only power markets are increasingly failing due to growing feed-in shares from subsidized renewable energy
sources (RES). The short answer to this is: No, they are not failing. Energy-based power markets are, however,
facing several market distortions, namely from the gap between the electricity volume traded at day-ahead
markets versus the overall electricity consumption as well as the (wrong) regulatory assumption that variable
RES generation, i.e., wind and photovoltaic (PV), truly have zero marginal operation costs.
In this paper we show that both effects over-amplify the well-known merit-order effect of RES power feed-in
beyond a level that is explainable by underlying physical realities, i.e., thermal power plants being willing to
accept negative electricity prices to be able to stay online due to considerations of wear & tear and start-stop
constraints. We analyze the impacts of wind and PV power feed-in on the day-ahead market for a region that
is already today experiencing significant feed-in tariff (FIT)-subsidized RES power feed-in, the EPEX German-
Austrian market zone (≈ 20% FIT share).
Our analysis shows that, if the necessary regulatory adaptations are taken, i.e., increasing the day-ahead
market’s share of overall load demand and using the true marginal costs of RES units in the merit-order, energy-
based power markets can remain functional despite high RES power feed-in.
I. INTRODUCTION
Around the same time as the liberalization of many of the European electricity markets in the early
1990s, government support schemes with the specific goal of promoting large-scale deployment of
renewable energy sources (RES) were introduced. The German Renewable Energy Act, ”Erneuerbare-
Energien-Gesetz” (EEG), a well-known support scheme, provides a favorable feed-in tariff (FIT) for a
variety of RES since the year 2000, building on its predecessor, the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz (1990). It
gives priority to electric power feed-in from RES over power feed-in from conventional power plants, i.e.,
fossil- and nuclear-fueled thermal and old, often large hydro-based power plants. This favorable invest-
ment case has generated installed capacities of about 35 GW each for wind and photovoltaic (PV) units
by year-end 2013 [1]. The evolution of installed variable RES capacities and annual energy production
in Germany from 1990 to 2012 [2], including an outlook till 2017 [3]. The original goal of FITs, i.e.,
large-scale RES deployment (Fig. 1a) and significant RES energy shares (Fig. 1b) is achieved.
With a combined installed capacity of wind & PV units of around 70 GW by year-end 2013, somewhat
higher than the average load demand in Germany (63–68 GW dependent on load demand measure [4],
[5]), wind & PV units clearly cannot be treated as exotic, marginal electricity sources anymore. The
current RES production has already significant effects on the power market, notably in the form of
the so-called merit-order effect. Especially the decoupling of day-ahead market prices and RES feed-in
due to FIT regulations, results in lower average day-ahead price levels and also in negative day-ahead
prices for several hours each month. In today’s European power market environment in which significant
over-capacities exist [6], yearly average spot market prices as well as base-peak spreads in Europe are
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Fig. 1. Overview of renewable energy sources (RES) deployment in Germany (1990–2017). Values for 2013–2017 are best estimates.
a) Evolution of installed power capacity of wind turbine and PV units. b) Evolution of annual feed-in of wind turbine and PV units.
at their lowest in years [7]. One effect of this is that flexible power plants such as gas-fired units cannot
be operated profitably because peak day-ahead prices are too often below their marginal operation costs.
Another effect is that due to the also decreasing spread of peak/base day-ahead prices, the profitability
of operating energy storage facilities, i.e., pumped storage hydro plants (PSHP) has been diminishing
in recent years [8].
While in the long run support schemes for RES units are likely to be phased-out, and they will thus
have to compete in a normal market setup, in the mid-term the power market structure may have to be
adapted to the increasing effects of RES deployment. For the subsequent investigation the two relevant
perspectives have to be taken into account:
1) Producer perspective: How to keep the profitability of necessary dispatchable base and peak load
power plants in a power market with high shares of RES?
2) Consumer perspective: How to lower the cost of FIT schemes and enable the transition to a less
subsidized (and eventually true) power market?
A. Producer Perspective
In Germany, and similarly in Austria, all FIT-supported RES power feed-in is settled at the day-ahead
market of the European Power Exchange (EPEX) either directly, e.g. in the form of power supply bids, or
indirectly, e.g. in the form of reduced load demand bids. This construction results in two major effects on
the day-ahead market. Firstly, because of the decoupling of FIT-supported RES feed-in from day-ahead
spot prices, the average spot price decreases, since all those bids will be located on the negative side of
the supply curve, e.g. going as low as −3000 e/MWh, in order to guarantee the settlement. Besides the
generally lower day-ahead spot price levels, negative day-ahead prices tend to occur, especially in low
demand & high wind situations. Secondly, because of the large deployment of PV, the peak/base spread
is decreasing significantly [7], [8]. Combined with today’s significant over-capacities of conventional
power plants in Europe [6], these developments result in profitability problems of both base and peak
load power plants as well as short-term storage units (i.e. pumped storage hydro plants (PSHPs)).
Short- and mid-term, a completely RES based electricity production on its own can neither provide
the necessary production volume nor the necessary reliability for fulfilling the load demand at all times
throughout the year. Conventional power plants, whose generation output can be controlled, are still
necessary for providing base and peak load demand, buffer the lack of wind and PV power feed-in
during absences of wind & sunshine and, generally, cover the prediction error of variable RES power
feed-in.
One proposed solution for this problem is the implementation of capacity markets, where (conven-
tional) power plants are rewarded not only for energy delivery but also for providing a firm power
capacity [9]. Capacity markets help to reduce power plant investment risk as they provide an additional
revenue stream for power plant owners. However, the introduction of capacity markets would add yet
another subsidy mechanism, preventing both an efficient functioning of the energy-only power market
and, in the long run, an affordable energy transition to significant RES shares in the electricity sector.
The idea of introducing capacity markets is thus challenged by others, who argue that energy-only
power markets can actually function efficiently for power systems with even higher RES shares than
today [10], [11].
B. Consumer Perspective
Out of the many possible support schemes for RES, FIT-based schemes turned out to be highly
effective energy policy instruments. As a result, large-scale deployment of RES, especially wind and
PV has been remarkably successful. The actual FIT payments, i.e., the difference between FIT tariffs
and hourly day-ahead market prices, is financed in Germany via an additional levy on electricity
consumption (EEG Umlage). Due to the EEG FIT scheme’s great success, this levy has become
significant, i.e. 6.24 ect/kWhel, or about 22%, of an average residential electricity rate of 29 ect/kWhel
(year 2014). The average German retail consumer electricity price is nowadays a midst the highest in
Europe [12] whereas the average day-ahead whole-sale electricity price is one of the lowest [7]. To
prevent additional long term price increases, the consumer has the interest that costs for FIT schemes
are lowered and that the integration of RES power feed-in into competitive power market frameworks
is achieved.
C. Outline
While in the long run, subsidy schemes for RES units will eventually be phased-out, the uncertainty
of RES electricity production, i.e., the inherent mismatch between production forecasts and actual
production, will persist. As an intermediate step to a fully competing power market setup for RES, where
they face a price risk and also have to pay for the forecast error, corrections of existing power market
frameworks are necessary. Such corrections have to ensure that consumer and producer perspectives are
satisfied, while minimizing regulatory actions.
In this paper we analyze the following two aspects of the EPEX power market, while leaving the
currently existing day-ahead power market setup intact:
1) Comparison of hourly power feed-in volume of wind & PV units to the overall load demand
volume.
2) Estimation of resulting day-ahead market price levels in case that the given wind & PV electricity
volumes are settled for a range of assumed possible marginal operation costs (0–20 e/MWhel),
see Section IV-A for the reasoning behind non-zero marginal costs of wind & PV units and an
indicative literature review.
Based on those assumptions we will discuss the effect on the power market as well as on power plants.
We will finally elude on the original question if substantial alterations to power market setups such as
the introduction of capacity markets are really necessary or whether there are simpler ways to reduce
market distortions in energy-only markets caused by large amounts of RES feed-in.
II. DATA
The analysis is based on high-resolution time-series data of the German power system, provided by
the transparency platform of the European Energy Exchange (EEX) [13] and the European Network of
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) data portal [5]. The analysis is done for the
full years 2011–13. Table I lists the employed time-series data and data sources.
TABLE I
USED DATA AND SOURCES
Time-Series Data Sources
Vertical grid load ENTSO-E
German day-ahead price EEX
German day-ahead bid/ask curve EEX
German wind feed-in EEX
German PV feed-in EEX
Vertical grid load, wind and PV feed-in are available with 15-min. resolution, while day-ahead prices
and bid/ask curves are available with hourly resolution. All analysis with data of both resolutions are
done on hourly resolutions and the 15-min. resolution data is down-sampled to fit hourly resolution.
Vertical grid load is adjusted to match the official total electricity supplied in Germany, i.e. 561.3 TWh
in 2011 (566.7 TWh in 2012) [2], [4]. The bid/ask curve data as provided by EEX seemed to be
somewhat filtered and restructured (exactly 200 demand/supply bids for each hourly step); supposedly
to blur the exact bid and ask structure. The available data quality is, however, fully sufficient for our
analysis. (Daylight saving time effects were appropriately removed.)
III. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF EPEX SPOT
A. Spot Market Volume and RES Production
The European Power Exchange (EPEX) is the dominant day-ahead and intra-day power market in
Central and Western Europe, directly serving Austria, France, Germany and Switzerland. Here, most of
the day-ahead spot market trading is performed via EPEX. The yearly clearing volume of the day-ahead
spot market of EPEX’s combined German/Austrian market zone amounted to around 224.6TWhel in
2011 [14]. However, this is only about 40.0% (or 35.8%) of the total electricity supplied of around
561.3TWhel in Germany (or ≈ 627.8TWhel in Germany and Austria combined) for 2011. By 2013,
these market shares had risen to 44.2% (DE) and 39.2% (DE+AT), respectively. All of Germany’s FIT-
subsidized RES generated electricity has to be traded on the EPEX day-ahead market (DE+AT market
zone). In 2011 this amounted to around 101.3TWhel or 16.8% of total electricity consumption. Out of
the overall FIT-subsidized RES feed-in 18.4% came from PV and 45.1% from wind turbines [2] (and
≈ 108TWhel combined for Germany and Austria). Variable RES units thus contributed about 63.5% of
all FIT-subsidized renewable electricity production. By 2013, the FIT-subsidized RES share had risen
to 112TWhel (DE) and 119TWhel (DE+AT), respectively.
B. Time-Series Analysis
In the following, a thorough analysis of the respective yearly time-series of the EPEX cleared trading
volume (German/Austrian market zone), the FIT-subsidized renewable electricity production and the
final electric load demand, both for Germany only, is performed. In the remainder of this section, all
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Fig. 2. Histogram of EPEX day-ahead spot volume versus German net load demand volume (in 2011).
result figures were calculated using hourly power feed-in and load demand time-series for the full-
year 2011 (8’760 hours). The results for the years 2012 and 2013 are qualitatively similar, exhibiting a
steady rise of both RES energy as well day-ahead market shares with respect to total load demand.
1) EPEX Trading Volume versus Load Demand: The amount of the cleared day-ahead market volume
as a function of final electricity consumption for a given hour oscillates between a minimum contribution
of 23.8% and a maximum contribution of 67.9%. A histogram of the EPEX day-ahead volume versus
German total load demand volume in 2011 is shown in Fig. 2. The average ratio between cleared
day-ahead market volume and electricity demand over the course of the year was 35.8% (volume-
weighted mean). It contributed thus a bit less than half, i.e., two-fifth, of all electricity demand in the
German/Austrian EPEX market zone for the full-year 2011.
2) RES feed-in versus Load Demand: The amount of FIT-subsidized RES production as a function
of total electricity consumption for a given hour oscillates between a minimum contribution of 5.1%
and a maximum contribution of 49.1%. The mean contribution over the full year is 15.6% (volume-
weighted mean). The PV energy share of net load demand varies between zero and 22.2% with a
volume-weighted mean of 3.4% (in 2011). The wind energy share of net load demand varies between
zero and 39.3% with a volume-weighted mean of 8.7% (in 2011).
3) RES feed-in versus EPEX Trading Volume: The amount of FIT-subsidized RES production that
is bid into the spot market as a function of overall cleared day-ahead market volume for a given hour
varies significantly over the course of the year. The ratio varies between a minimum of 15.3% and a
maximum of 95.0%. The mean contribution of FIT-subsidized RES feed-in to the total day-ahead market
volume over the full year is 45.0% (volume-weighted mean). FIT-subsidized RES generated electricity
contributes thus a bit less than half of all electricity generation that is traded in the German/Austrian
EPEX market zone. A histogram of the FIT-subsidized RES feed-in volume versus the EPEX day-ahead
volume in 2011 is given in Fig. 3. The PV energy share of the day-ahead market volume varies between
zero and 47.4% with a volume-weighted mean of 8.6% (in 2011). In comparison to this, the wind energy
share of the day-ahead market volume varies between zero and 67.5% with a volume-weighted mean
of 21.8% (in 2011). Other EEG feed-in, i.e., biomass, landfill and bio gas as well as small hydro, make
up a volume-weighted mean of ≈ 20% of total EPEX volume (in 2011).
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Fig. 3. Histogram of subsidized RES feed-in volume versus EPEX day-ahead spot volume (in 2011).
C. Results
Although all FIT-subsidized RES generated electricity contributed less than a fifth of Germany’s and
Austria’s combined total load demand (≈ 19.2% in 2012, ≈ 20.0% in 2013), it constituted close to
half (≈ 38.7% in 2012, ≈ 39.2% in 2013) of the traded electricity volume of EPEX’s German/Austrian
market zone. This is clearly illustrated by the gap between the histograms of both the FIT-subsidized
RES feed-in volume versus total load demand and EPEX day-ahead volume, respectively, as given
in Fig. 4.
The underlying reason for the observed volatile day-ahead price dynamics caused by the merit-order
effect thus becomes obvious: The day-ahead market is, volume-wise, largely dominated by subsidized
RES feed-in, which thus drives the dynamics of the day-ahead price clearing mechanism. This is in
stark contrast to the physical situation in the German power system, in which FIT-subsidized RES
feed-in plays a minor, but rising role. An obvious approach for mitigating highly fluctuating day-ahead
prices within the existing energy-only power market is thus to increase the trading volume of day-
ahead markets by incorporating more of the conventional electricity production that is currently sold
bilaterally, i.e., over-the-counter (OTC), outside the EPEX day-ahead market.
D. Comparison of EPEX and Nord Pool Spot Market
Comparing the situation of the EPEX day-ahead market to the situation in a neighboring power
market reveals interesting insights. The Nord Pool is a mature multinational day-ahead spot market
that comprises the north and north-eastern European countries Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and
Estonia [15]. The yearly total load demand of the Nord Pool countries (≈ 440TWhel) is comparable
in scale to the German/Austrian EPEX market zone (≈ 665TWhel) [4]. Both power markets comprise
day-ahead and intra-day markets that are organized similarly (energy-only, with a strategic reserve in
Scandinavia). Nord Pool is, as a directly neighboring and well-connected market with a similarly high
RES integration and a similarly small number of few big players with conventional plants, in fact an
ideal candidate for a comparison.
The stark contrast between the two power markets is that only around two-fifth (≈ 39% in 2013) of
the yearly load demand in the German/Austrian grid zone is traded on the in EPEX day-ahead market,
more than four-fifth (≈ 85% in 2013) of the load demand of the Nord Pool countries (except Estonia)
is traded on the day-ahead market.
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Fig. 4. Histograms of subsidized RES feed-in versus German net load demand volume and EPEX day-ahead volume (in 2011).
The evolution of the EPEX day-ahead (EEX spot until 2009) and Nord Pool day-ahead market shares
of the yearly load demand in their respective market zones is illustrated in Fig. 5. Market shares of
both day-ahead markets have significantly grown over the years, but the Nord Pool day-ahead market
has a sizable lead in market share over EPEX. Please note that not necessarily all of the FIT-subsidized
RES feed-in in Germany and Austria (≈ 20% in 2013) may be given directly to the EPEX day-ahead
market, i.e., as supply-side bids. Since 2010 there is an obligation on German transmission system
operators (TSO) to put all FIT-/EEG-subsidized electricity directly onto the day-ahead market. However,
due to the increase of so-called direct marketing of RES feed-in by private actors, notably wind power,
the data situation is not entirely transparent. Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that all variable RES
feed-in from wind & PV units – by it’s very nature a short term commodity – influences the day-ahead
spot market at least indirectly, i.e., in the form of reduced load demand. To our best knowledge, there
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Fig. 5. Evolution of day-ahead market shares in the EEX/EPEX German/Austrian market zone compared to the Nord Pool spot market.
Fig. 6. Qualitative structure of merit-order bid/ask curves: (a) in the current EPEX day-ahead spot market, (b) in a mandatory pool.
is no inherent limitation and, hence, credible reason why similar spot market shares as in the Nordic
countries could not be reached also in Germany, Austria or elsewhere in Europe.
One policy instrument for increasing the market share of the day-ahead market would be the introduction
of a mandatory pool for physical energy procurement as is the case in Spain (OMEL) and the US power
markets (e.g. PJM) [16, p. 71, p. 106], at least during a transitional phase, and the use of the futures
market for hedging.
By doubling the EPEX day-ahead market share, the FIT-subsidized RES feed-in share at the day-
ahead market is, on average, cut in half. Quite obviously this would lead to a significant reduction of the
well-known merit-order effect of RES power production. Structurally, the reduction of the merit-order
effect is due to the on average lower slope
(
dPspot
dVspot
)
of the supply bid curve. Due to the larger overall
supply volume (Vfull > Vpartial) especially regarding base load generation units (Vbase, low, Vbase, high), the
spot price volatility ∆PRES due to the volatility of the RES production volume ∆VRES is significantly
lower as is illustrated in Fig. 6.
With the following assumptions:
I the full spot price range, i.e. [±3’000e/MWhel], is already covered in today’s spot market supply
curve (confer to Fig. 7 for an actual bid/ask curve example),
II under a mandatory pool regime, spot market supply volume will be higher than today, i.e. Vfull >
Vpartial,
the supply curve slope in a mandatory spot market pool has to be, on average, lower than today (or at
most equal): (
dPspot
dVspot
)
Vfull
≤
(
dPspot
dVspot
)
Vpartial
. (1)
The quantitative effect of the RES feed-in share at the day-ahead market on the merit-order effect is
part of subsequent investigations in Section IV.
IV. EFFECTS OF INCLUDING RES MARGINAL COSTS IN POWER MARKET ASK CURVE
In the following we analyze the quantitative effect on day-ahead prices if wind and PV feed-in would
have to be settled at the day-ahead market using the marginal operation costs of RES units. The volume
risk of the forecast error, i.e., predicted feed-in versus realized feed-in, is not covered by the RES
supplier. Note, that this situation would still constitute a support scheme but a milder one than the
existing FIT scheme. Compared to a fossil-fueled power plant, “fuel costs of wind & PV plants or any
other variable RES production units such as run-of-river hydro plants or the solar field of concentrating
solar power (CSP) plants are obviously zero. (Note that a gas-fueled part of a CSP plant would obviously
incur fuel costs.)
There are, however, other cost components that can be considered as marginal operation costs for
variable RES units. These can include marginal wear & tear from plant operation, at least the part that can
be directly attributed to run-time and energy produced, for any turbine-driven plant as well as concession
taxes and land-lease payments that are calculated per unit energy produced (in MWhel). Energy-based
marginal concession taxes exist, for example, for hydro units in Vallais, Switzerland (Wasserzins) and
Saxony, Germany (Wasserentnahmeabgabe). Land-lease payments, e.g., for the land-use of wind & PV
units are at the discretion of the involved parties, i.e., land-owner and RES plant owner, but often do
include a revenue component for the electricity plant.
Mid-term, e.g., by the time existing FIT-support schemes are phased-out or adapted to not include a
grid feed-in guarantee, it is likely that at least a part of the day-ahead price and volume risk of RES
feed-in has to be covered by these units, notably wind & PV, directly. Such an obligation would result
in a form of an insurance fee or risk coverage for the forecast error of the variable RES electricity
production. Today, system operators usually do have to cover the forecast error by acquiring control
reserve power capacity a priori, which then provides the needed balancing energy in real-time.
Total marginal operation cost of running variable RES units is thus the sum of the individual cost
components:
Marginal production costs of RES unit [e/MWhel] = wear & tear cost [e/MWhel]
+ land-lease cost [e/MWhel]
+ concession tax [e/MWhel]
+ forecast error [e/MWhel] .
The effect is that the marginal operational costs for RES production, especially wind & PV units,
become positive, since at least the risk coverage costs must be earned by the actual electricity production.
This, obviously, will change the bidding behavior of wind & PV units as well as the structure of the
merit-order curve. For a system’s perspective on RES grid integration costs, confer to [17].
A. Literature Review – Marginal Costs for Wind&PV units
We obtained general wear&tear operation costs of RES units, essentially operation and maintenance
(O&M) costs, from a literature survey of recent reports on electricity generation costs [18]–[20].
Operation cost for wind (onshore) generation were in the range of 15–27 e/MWhel, whereas for PV
generation costs were in the range of 22–33 e/MWhel. Within OECD countries median O&M values
of 17 e/MWhel for onshore wind and of 23 e/MWhel for PV have been presented [18, p. 102]. The
largest share of these operation costs will not be truly marginal, i.e., in the sense that additional cost
will be incurred for every additional (marginal) electricity unit (in MWhel) produced. For the moving
parts of wind turbines etc. one can fairly attribute some marginal O&M cost, whereas on can probably
not do so in the case of PV units.
Marginal costs for land-lease as well as concession taxes will always be site-specific. For the above
mentioned hydro concession taxes the cost range is about 10–20 e/MWhel.
The marginal costs or insurance fee for covering the risk of forecast errors and the involved costs for
calling on control reserve power and energy via ancillary service markets will also be site-specific and
depend on the responsible system operator. In the case of the German TSOs, an estimation of balancing
costs for wind & PV forecast errors is possible due to recent regulatory transparency efforts. Balancing
costs have recently been assessed to be in the range of 0–10 e/MWhel for the years 2011–2013 [21].
B. Wind & PV Supply Bid Assumptions
The subsequent analysis is based on certain assumptions regarding wind & PV marginal costs and
supply bids:
• In case the FIT scheme provides a feed-in guarantee for all FIT-supported RES production: we
assume that the transmission system operator (TSO) gives all RES with a large negative price
bid, i.e., –3000 e/MWhel to the day-ahead market, to ensure the settlement.
• In case the FIT scheme does not provide a feed-in guarantee for all FIT-supported RES production:
we assume total marginal operation costs for both wind & PV units to be in the range of 0–
25 e/MWhel and simulate in steps of 5 e/MWhel.
• Only wind and PV power feed-in are considered since they represent the majority, i.e., two-third,
of German FIT-subsidized RES feed-in.
• There is no separation between on-shore and off-shore wind power feed-in. Currently less than
5% of the installed wind capacity in Germany is off-shore and therefore negligible at the moment.
In the future two different O&M costs for off-shore and on-shore wind power feed-in have to be
considered.
• The demand side of power markets is not affected.
C. Method
Wind/PV FIT feed-in is settled over the day-ahead market with an ask of –3000 e/MWhel, since the
FIT paid is independent from the achieved day-ahead spot market price and the TSO has to ensure the
settlement of the RES feed-in. One of the main questions is now, what would be the resulting market
prices, if wind & PV would have to be settled under market conditions. In the following we investigate
the impacts of settling RES feed-in with realistic marginal costs, as given in Section IV-A.
For the calculations we settle the day-ahead market based on the EPEX bid-ask-curve. We leave the
demand curve untouched and rearrange the ask curve by applying the corresponding marginal costs
on wind & PV volume. The settlement is done based on the EPEX settlement [22]. Fig. 7 shows the
volume of the realized and the modified ask curve. Here, settling wind & PV with assumed marginal
costs results in a visible jump for wind energy bids and the resulting power market ask curve.
D. Results
For the analysis, we calculate artificial day-ahead prices assuming significant marginal costs, i.e.,
25e/MWhel. of RES feed-in for the following scenarios:
1) Only wind feed-in is settled with marginal costs.
2) Only PV feed-in is settled with marginal costs.
3) Wind & PV feed-in are settled with marginal costs.
We discuss the effects that the resulting artificial day-ahead prices have on the three principal power
plant types, i.e., base load, flexible peak load plants and storage units.
1) Analysis of Spot Price Formation: First, we analyze the effect when wind feed-in is settled with
marginal costs whereas PV feed-in is still subsidized. Fig. 8 shows the settlement of day-ahead prices
under the assumption, that wind energy is settled with marginal costs. It is shown, that no negative
price effects are existing anymore. Some hours are settled below the marginal cost of wind units. In
these hours the power feed-in from other, cheaper sources is sufficient for covering the load demand;
no wind power was dispatched.
Fig. 9 shows the constructed day-ahead prices where wind feed-in is still supported with FIT and PV
is settled using marginal costs. The analysis shows, that the pure PV feed-in over marginal costs does not
change the overall settlement of high prices above the marginal cost level. The spikes in the day-ahead
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Fig. 7. Modified EPEX spot market bid/ask curve (RES bids = 25e/MWhel), 1 January 2011 (1st hour).
prices remain and so do negative day-ahead price events. The negative spot prices do not vanish in the
pure PV scenario because they are all occurring during off-peak times, where PV production coincides
with high demand. If the installed PV capacity increases further, we may observe negative prices during
peak hours as a result of PV feed-in as well.
Fig. 10 shows the bid/ask curves using marginal costs for wind & PV power feed-in. As for wind
feed-in only, some hours exist below the marginal costs of PV, which are lower than the wind marginal
costs. In those hours, production from other base load power plants is sufficient; no RES power was
dispatched.
2) Producer Perspective: As discussed in Section I, we analyze the effect of the settlement of wind
& PV feed-in on three groups of power plants:
1) Base load power plants (nuclear, lignite, hard coal),
2) Peak load power plants (gas and storage plants),
3) Short term storage (PSHP and other technologies).
As shown previously in Fig. 10, all negative prices vanish as soon as RES units have to settle
with their respective marginal costs. In some hours the settled day-ahead price is even lower than the
marginal cost of PV and covered by other base load plants. In addition, the marginal costs of at least
some base load power plants are below the marginal cost of wind & PV units. The existence of bids
below the introduced marginal costs for wind & PV indicates that conventional base load power plants
have marginal costs below the marginal costs for wind & PV. Besides negative marginal costs, which
is often the result of avoiding otherwise necessary power plant down-ramping or even shutdowns in
some hours, also longer periods of no wind & PV production exist and therefore large base load power
plants can run profitable below the in this paper assumed marginal costs for wind & PV.
The second category of plants, flexible fossil-fueled plants like natural gas fired units and larger storage
plants, are not affected by the change, since they profit from peak hours.
3) Consumer Perspective: The high costs generated by the FIT will be lowered, because the RES
generation can be settled at a significantly higher price. Costs for the coverage of the forecast error
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Fig. 8. Comparison of realized day-ahead spot prices without (FIT) and with marginal operation costs (25e/MWhel); wind feed-in only.
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Fig. 9. Comparison of realized day-ahead with FIT and day-ahead with marginal costs (RES bids=25e/MWhel); PV feed-in only.
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Fig. 10. Comparison of realized day-ahead with FIT and day-ahead with marginal costs (RES bids=25e/MWhel) (wind & PV feed-in).
of wind and PV generators are still present, but determining the incurred costs due to this is clearly
beyond the scope of the paper. Given the long-term guarantee of the FIT scheme (20 years), the overall
RES deployment cost can be lowered significantly and a transition to a competitive spot market seems
possible.
4) RES Producer Perspective under Market Constraints: As shown in Fig. 7 and 10, a large amount
of RES feed-in is still settled via the day-ahead spot market, if RES feed-in is given to the market
with marginal costs. While during the FIT period, only the costs for FIT will be lowered, a real market
situation, independent from the prediction error, seems also possible. Future work will address the
impact of such a regime change, which gives no RES feed-in guarantee, for the effective RES grid
integration.
E. Sensitivity Analysis of Marginal Operation Costs
Since the real marginal costs of wind & PV are site-specific and thus hard to estimate, we have
compiled a sensitivity analysis of the impacts of different assumed marginal operation costs, ranging
from 0–20 e/MWhel in steps of 5 e/MWhel, for either wind or PV power feed-in.
The effects of these assumed marginal costs on the day-ahead market clearing are illustrated in Fig. 11.
A quantitative analysis of average day-ahead spot prices and their volatility is given in Tab. II–V. While
the effects increase with higher marginal costs, the overall observations of the paper are nevertheless
validated. As can be seen, average day-ahead spot market prices will be higher if wind or PV feed-in
is bid into the day-ahead market with positive marginal costs. Also, the price volatility (i.e., standard
deviation) is decreasing. Both effects are significantly more pronounced in the case of wind power
feed-in, as shown in Fig. 11 (a) clearly shows that positive marginal costs for wind feed-in push the
day-ahead clearing prices above zero in all instances. This is not the case for PV feed-in, see Fig. 11 (b).
The original clearing results for an feed-in guarantee via highly negative bids (–3000 e/MWhel) are
also shown.
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Fig. 11. Comparison of realized day-ahead with FIT and with varying marginal costs (0–20e/MWhel): (a) only wind, (b) only PV.
TABLE II
AVERAGE DAY-AHEAD SPOT PRICE
Marginal cost of PV Year
(e/MWhel) 2011 2012 2013
-3000 51.5 42.8 37.9
5 51.55 42.8 38.0
10 51.6 42.8 38.0
15 51.6 42.8 38.1
20 51.6 42.9 38.3
TABLE III
STANDARD DEVIATION OF DAY-AHEAD SPOT PRICE
Marginal cost of PV Year
(e/MWhel) 2011 2012 2013
-3000 13.4 18.6 16.5
5 13.4 18.6 16.2
10 13.3 18.6 16.2
15 13.3 18.6 16.0
20 13.3 18.5 15.8
TABLE IV
AVERAGE DAY-AHEAD SPOT PRICE
Marginal cost of Wind Year
(e/MWhel) 2011 2012 2013
-3000 51.5 42.8 37.9
5 51.6 43.2 38.0
10 51.6 43.3 38.1
15 51.7 43.4 38.5
20 51.8 43.6 38.9
TABLE V
STANDARD DEVIATION OF DAY-AHEAD SPOT PRICE
Marginal cost of Wind Year
(e/MWhel) 2011 2012 2013
-3000 13.4 18.6 16.5
5 13.3 15.8 15.9
10 13.2 15.7 15.7
15 13.0 15.5 15.2
20 12.7 15.0 14.5
V. CONCLUSION
While feed-in tariff (FIT)-subsidized renewable energy sources (RES) generated electricity contributed
less than one-fifth of Germany’s total electric load demand per year, it represents almost half of the
traded day-ahead spot volume. This is no surprise as the European Power Exchange (EPEX) day-ahead
market only has a market share of about two-fifth of Germany’s total load demand in recent years
(2011–2013). The day-ahead market is therefore largely dominated by subsidized RES feed-in, which
in turn drives the dynamics of the day-ahead price clearing mechanism. The well-known merit-order
effect of RES power feed-in, i.e. falling day-ahead spot price levels as well as highly fluctuating day-
ahead prices, is thus amplified to a level that is in clear contrast with the physical situation in the
German power system, in which RES feed-in still plays a minor, albeit rapidly rising role.
An obvious approach for mitigating the merit-order effect within the existing energy-only power
market, i.e., without changing the market mechanism towards a capacity market or else, is to increase
the day-ahead spot markets trading volume to actually capture the majority of the load demand. This
can be achieved by incorporating more of the electricity production that is currently sold bilaterally, i.e.,
over-the-counter (OTC), outside of the day-ahead market. Comparably mature power markets like Nord
Pool Spot in the Nordic countries achieve a market share of more than four-fifth of the respective total
load demand. The authors believe that reducing the volume dominance of RES feed-in in the EPEX
spot by means of mandatory spot pools will significantly reduce the existing RES merit-order effect.
We also show that the settlement of RES at the day-ahead market with marginal cost is possible.
Negative prices disappear and in most days, at least some of the RES production volume is settled.
Base load power plants profit from the situation because of an elevated average day-ahead price level.
Gas-fired power plants and hydro storage units covering peak hours are not effected, since peak prices
are not effected by the above discussed changes. Because of the further decreasing peak-base spot price
spread, the already non-profitable short term storage plants suffer even more. Given fully dispatchable
power plants that have sufficient operational flexibility in technical terms, i.e., fast ramping, start/stop
times and minimum operation point requirements, energy-only power markets seem to work even for
high RES penetration scenarios (≫ 25%).
REFERENCES
[1] REN21, “Renewables 2014 Global Status Report,” 2014. [Online]. Available: www.ren21.net
[2] AG Energiebilanzen e.V., “Energiestatistiken,” 2013. [Online]. Available: www.ag-energiebilanzen.de
[3] BDEW Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft e.V., “Erneuerbare Energien und das EEG: Zahlen, Fakten, Grafiken
(2013),” Jan. 2013. [Online]. Available: www.bdew.de
[4] International Energy Agency (IEA), “Electricity Information,” 2012.
[5] ENTSO-E Data Portal, “German hourly load data,” March 2012. [Online]. Available: www.entsoe.eu
[6] The Economist, “How to lose half a trillion euros.” [Online]. Available:
www.economist.com/news/briefing/21587782-europes-electricity-providers-face-existential-threat-how-lose-half-trillion-euros
[7] EPEX, “European Power Exchange (EPEX) – Annual Reports,” 2009-2013. [Online]. Available: www.epexspot.com/en/
[8] M. Hildmann, A. Ulbig, and G. Andersson, “Electricity Grid In-feed from Renewable Sources: A Risk for Pumped-Storage Hydro
Plants,” in 8th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM11), Zagreb, Croatia, 2011.
[9] Deutsche Energie-Agentur GmbH (dena), “Integration der erneuerbaren Energien in den deutsch-europa¨ischen Strommarkt.” p. 173,
2012.
[10] M. Nicolosi, “Necessity of Capacity Mechanisms,” p. 72, 2012. [Online]. Available: www.ecofys.com
[11] ——, “Leitstudie Strommarkt – Arbeitspaket Optimierung des Strommarktdesigns,” July 2014. [Online]. Available:
www.bmwi.de/DE/Mediathek/publikationen,did=643918.html
[12] European Commission (EC), “Energy prices and costs report (2014),” March 2014.
[13] EEX, “European Energy Exchange (EEX) Transparency Homepage,” 2013. [Online]. Available: www.transparency.eex.com/en/
[14] EPEX, “European Power Exchange (EPEX),” 2013. [Online]. Available: www.epexspot.com/en/
[15] Nord Pool Spot, “Nord Pool Spot Annual Reports,” 2002–2012. [Online]. Available: www.nordpoolspot.com
[16] F. P. Sioshansi, Competitive Electricity Markets: Design, Implementation, Performance. Elsevier, 2011.
[17] L. Hirth, F. Ueckerdt, and O. Edenhofer, “Integration costs and the value of wind power. thoughts on a valuation framework for
variable renewable electricity sources,” Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Vattenfall GmbH, 2012.
[18] International Energy Agency (IEA), “Projected Costs of Generating Electricity – 2010 Edition,” 2010.
[19] F. Bauer and C. Stolzenberger, “EURELECTRIC/VGB Industry Representatives of ”IEA Projected Costs of Generating Electricity
– 2010 Edition” Study (page 91),” 2012.
[20] Fraunhofer ISE, C. Kost, S. Thomas, J. Thomsen, S. Nold, and J. Mayer, “Levelized Cost of Electricity Renewable Energies,” 2012.
[21] J. Mu¨ller, M. Hildmann, A. Ulbig, and G. Andersson, “Grid integration costs of fluctuating renewable energy sources,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1407.7237, 2014.
[22] European Energy Exchange (EEX), “Determination of Settlement Prices,” European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig, Tech. Rep.,
2012. [Online]. Available: www.eex.de
